There have been several news about certain individuals who pretend to be someone else in order to fast-track some transactions. Others also pretend to be government officials and employees in order to collect money or properties for their own gain. There are however other instances where an official exercises a function or office which is not within the powers and functions given by law or that such power or office has now ceased. One case of usurpation of power was decided by the Supreme Court in 1956. The Mayor Latorre of Villareal, Samar designated municipal councilor Hilvano to discharge the duties of municipal mayor while the former travelled to Manila. Hilvano then assumed his designation but when Vice Mayor Juan Latorre arrived at the Municipal Hall on the same day, he informed Hilvano that he is going to discharge the official functions of the mayor who was absent. Hilvano refused to yield despite being shown the provisions of the Administrative Code which states that the Vice Mayor assumes the office of the Municipal Mayor in his absence. The vice mayor then sought the opinion of the provincial fiscal who agreed with the vice mayor. Despite this, Hilvano went on to discharge the functions of the mayor including the solemnization of marriages, appointing employees, and collecting the salary corresponding to that of a mayor. Hilvano was then charged with usurpation under Article 117 of the Revised Penal Code. In his defense, Hilvano argued that only private individuals can be prosecuted with the offense of usurpation and since he is an elected official he cannot be found guilty of the offense. Hilvano was convicted and his conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court on appeal. The SC said: “In the beginning he might have pleaded good faith, invoking the designation by the Mayor; but after he had been shown the letter of the Executive Secretary and the opinion of the provincial fiscal, he had no right thereafter stubbornly to stick to the position. He was rightfully convicted.” (G.R. No. L-8583. July 31, 1956. People vs. Hilvano)
Although the case was decided in accordance with the Administrative Code and not the Local Government Code (LGC), the same conclusion can be reached if the latter will be applied. The provisions of the LGC clearly states that if the “local chief executive is traveling within the country but outside his territorial jurisdiction for a period not exceeding three (3) consecutive days, he may designate in writing the officer-in-charge of the said office.” (Sec. 46) The provision did not specify who should be designated as officer-in-charge but another provision actually states that only the vice mayor (or the highest ranking sanggunian member in appropriate cases) may be designated. This provision of the LGC on the designation of the officer-in-charge means that if the absence does not exceed 3 days, the designation is optional. Meaning, an OIC may not be designated at all. If the absence exceeds three days however, the vice mayor shall automatically discharge the functions of the mayor even without any designation in writing, until the arrival of the mayor. This is because the absence of the mayor should not hamper or derail the delivery of services of the municipal government to its constituent. It would be unthinkable for a mayor to leave his station for extended periods without any person to assume his functions in his stead. The person to assume the functions must only be those mentioned in the Local Government Code otherwise he will be liable under Article 117 of the Revised Penal Code just like Hilvano.